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487 
Book Review 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT. Aileen Kavanagh.1 Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 2009. Pp. xiii + 455. $139.00 (Cloth), 
$61.99 (Paperback). 
W.J. Waluchow2 
In 1998, the United Kingdom (“UK”) experienced what 
could plausibly be characterized as a constitutional revolution, 
which was described by British constitutional lawyer, Keith 
Ewing, as “the most significant formal redistribution of political 
power in this country since 1911, and perhaps since 1688.”3 
Under the newly introduced Human Rights Act (“HRA”), 
courts in the UK were, for the first time, explicitly empowered to 
review UK legislation against a codified set of rights, namely 
those found in the European Convention of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”). This is an international treaty to which the UK, as a 
member of the Council of Europe, had long been a signatory. 
Before 1998, the only form of redress for UK citizens, concerned 
with what they claimed to be violation of their Convention rights 
by UK government bodies was appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. This is a body whose judgments, 
though given some (variable) measure of respect by the official 
organs of the UK government and judiciary, were not considered 
binding under UK law. The relationship between Strasbourg and 
these UK domestic bodies was anything but clear, comfortable, 
 
 1. Reader in Law, University of Leicester. 
 2. Senator William McMaster Chair in Constitutional Studies, Department of 
Philosophy, McMaster University.  
 3. P. 1 (quoting Keith Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary 
Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 79 (1999)). 
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or stable. But by incorporating the Convention directly into UK 
law, all that changed. Citizens were able to appeal directly to UK 
courts for judgments concerning the compatibility of domestic 
UK laws with the rights (of the ECHR) now codified in the 
HRA. 
Those whose thoughts about the nature and justification of 
judicial review (or what Aileen Kavanagh prefers to call 
“constitutional review”) have been shaped by exposure to the 
relatively strong form(s) it takes under an entrenched, 
constitutional document like the United States Bill of Rights 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms with it’s Section 33 “notwithstanding” or 
“override” clause, may be surprised to discover an absence, in 
the UK, of many familiar features. Two differences stand out: 
(a) the HRA is, strictly speaking, an ordinary act of Parliament 
and, as such, is subject to ordinary procedures of repeal and 
amendment; and (b) UK judges do not enjoy the more familiar 
authority of American and Canadian judges to “strike down” 
laws judged to be in violation of recognized rights. Instead, they 
are required to take one of the following two steps. First, in cases 
where legislation, as it would normally be interpreted, is judged 
to infringe Convention rights, UK judges are required, under 
Section 3 of the HRA, to provide an authoritative interpretation 
of the otherwise offending legislation that renders it compatible 
with Convention rights. Often this interpretation will be one 
which departs from the plain, ordinary meaning of the 
legislation, or from the intended meaning plausibly ascribed to 
its drafters. In other words, judges are required to provide an 
authoritative interpretation which, but for the force of Section 3, 
would almost certainly be condemned as forced and unnatural, 
or an instance of judges trying to reinvent the law under the 
guise of interpretation, thereby usurping a legislative role 
properly reserved for democratically accountable bodies like 
Parliament. When all efforts to provide an appropriate 
interpretation fail, Section 4 of the HRA requires UK judges to 
issue a “declaration of incompatibility,” a public statement of 
how and why the provisions in question cannot be rendered 
compatible with the relevant Convention right(s). It is then up to 
the offending body—or more precisely, the body judged by the 
court to have offended the HRA—to take whatever remedial 
steps, if any, it deems appropriate. Strictly speaking, then, a 
declaration of incompatibility fails to disturb the legal status quo. 
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These features of the HRA may lead one to think that the 
monumental step described by Ewing was not really much of a 
step at all. One of Kavanagh’s objectives in this splendid book is 
to disabuse us of this idea, while at the same time assuaging the 
concerns of those who fear that the HRA marks a far too 
dramatic departure from centuries-long UK constitutional 
history, in particular its long-time commitment to the principles 
of Parliamentary sovereignty and democracy. Kavanagh 
skillfully surveys the relevant case law and the official (and non-
official) records of public, judicial and parliamentary debates 
surrounding adoption, implementation and application of the 
HRA. Kavanagh also succeeds in demonstrating that 
constitutional practice under the HRA is not as far removed 
from what one finds in Canada and the United States as might 
appear, at first glance. It is certainly not as far removed as would 
be suggested by a superficial understanding of the two features 
described above. But these changes are not so dramatic as to 
represent the complete abandonment of centuries-long 
parliamentary and democratic traditions either. Kavanagh sets 
out to demonstrate that the traditional, orthodox doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty is an exaggeration, and that the 
strong interpretive powers granted under Section 3 of the HRA 
are not qualitatively different from the powers judges have long 
enjoyed under common law. 
So why is all this the case? Consider each of the two 
features mentioned above, beginning with the fact that the HRA 
is an ordinary Act of Parliament, and therefore as formally 
subject to amendment and repeal as the most mundane of tax 
laws. As Kavanagh ably shows, the HRA is, in reality, nothing 
close to an ordinary statute. Given factors like the subject matter 
of the HRA (human rights), the fact that it incorporates 
Convention rights, which the UK has long been bound to 
observe as a matter of international treaty, and the world-wide 
trend towards the constitutionalisation of human rights coupled 
with fairly robust forms of constitutional review, it would be well 
nigh impossible for the UK Parliament to turn around and 
repeal or substantially amend the HRA. Tony Blair “once 
suggested that he would consider seeking to amend the HRA if 
it proved to be an obstacle to the ‘war on terror’” (p. 7 n. 37), 
but, Kavanagh intimates, such a move would have been political 
suicide. Once a nation has taken the monumental step of 
codifying a set of human rights and placing in the hands of its 
courts the responsibility of overseeing and judging government 
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action against the standard it sets, it is very difficult to turn back. 
It is hard to imagine a government, whose continued existence 
and effectiveness depend on sustained public support from the 
electorate and the other official branches of the state, in effect 
declaring its opposition to human rights by repealing the HRA, 
or seriously diluting it by way of amendment. So even if there is 
nothing in black letter constitutional law to prevent either of 
these moves, political reality serves as a virtually insurmountable 
check on the exercise of the relevant legal power. For all intents 
and purposes, the HRA is as entrenched a part of the UK 
constitution as the Bill of Rights is of the United States 
Constitution. Only a very narrow, formalistic view of 
constitutions that sees their identity and content as exhausted by 
the formal terms of entrenched, judicially enforceable 
documents, would deny this constitutional reality. 
Turning now to the second notable feature of the HRA—
that it does not provide for the legal power to strike down 
legislation—we once again see Kavanagh demonstrating that 
appearances are deceiving. The burden of her argument is to 
show, via an extensive review of both pre- and post-HRA case 
law and practice, that the powers of review granted by the HRA 
are not only fully justifiable as integral parts of a democratically 
legitimate system of government, they are also not substantially 
different from powers which UK judges have exercised for 
centuries. Take Section 3 again, for example. According to 
Kavanagh,  
we should first bear in mind that section 3(1) does not give 
the courts radically new methods of interpretation which they 
did not possess pre-HRA. Judges have always possessed (and 
exercised) the power to rectify statutory language, if to do so 
would remove an injustice or violate a fundamental 
constitutional principle. . . . The law reports are full of (pre-
HRA) cases where the courts supplied ‘the omission of the 
legislature’ to protect rights such as natural justice, or refused 
to follow the clear implications of statutory terms where it 
would deny a fundamental right or cause clear injustice. . . . 
[T]he ability of the courts to depart from ordinary meaning 
and to ‘read in’ and ‘read down’ in order to prevent a 
violation of [constitutional] principles, was not one judges 
received for the first time in 1998 (p. 115). 
Section 4 of the HRA, as we have seen, requires judges to 
issue a declaration of incompatibility should all efforts to find a 
Convention-compatible reading of the relevant legislation end in 
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failure. Such declarations have no immediate legal effect, either 
for the party alleging a breach of his or her Convention rights, or 
for the law judged to be incompatible. The law in question 
retains its validity, together with its force and effect in the case at 
hand. But once again, there is, according to Kavanagh, much 
more than meets the eye. “[T]he immense political pressure to 
comply with declarations of incompatibility is only part of the 
picture. The rest of that picture is made up of legal pressures” (p. 
321). Among these are the UK’s obligation, under international 
law, to uphold Convention rights in their legal and political 
practices, and the fact that the UK is subject to an adverse 
finding of the Strasbourg Court that it stands in violation of 
Convention rights if it fails to live up to this obligation. Yet 
another factor is the status of a declaration as an authoritative (if 
not formally binding) pronouncement of legal principle by the 
nation’s highest courts. Few governments will wish to be publicly 
tarred with the brush of violation in such circumstances. These 
and other factors not only explain why deference to a court’s 
declaration of incompatibility has been observed in every single 
case since the HRA was adopted, it serves to explain the good 
sense in saying that, in effect, the powers of UK judges under the 
HRA are, in reality, virtually identical with the powers enjoyed 
by their North American counterparts. “[A]s a judicial tool to 
secure the protection of Convention rights in primary legislation, 
the declaration of incompatibility is far from weak . . . . Apart 
from its lack of direct remedial consequences for the individual 
litigant, it is very similar, both in form and effect, to a judicial 
‘strike-down’ power” (p. 417). In short, it functions as a 
declaration of constitutional principle. 
That one has the power to perform a particular action does 
not, of course, always imply that one ought to do so, any more 
than it follows from the fact that one has the right to speak in 
some particular context that one ought to do so. Nowhere is this 
truth more evident than in cases involving constitutional review. 
In Part II of her book, Kavanagh sets out to investigate how UK 
courts can carry out their duty to uphold Convention rights while 
at the same time exercising an appropriate degree of 
“deference” to the legislative branch. Courts and legislatures 
often disagree about how best to understand or interpret a 
particular human right provision. As a result, they often disagree 
as well about whether a particular legislative Act, read in the 
usual way, or in the way intended by those on whose initiative 
the Act gained its existence, is consistent with that provision. Is a 
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law authorizing UK government agents to subject suspected 
terrorists to indefinite detention, without the usual safeguards 
associated with natural justice and due process of law, an 
unwarranted violation of the right to “a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law” (Convention, Article 6)? Any 
government that enacts such a law presumably does not think so, 
or it would not have enacted the law in the form it took. But 
judges often disagree, leaving them with the unenviable task of 
deciding how best to respond. Should they declare an 
incompatibility with all the attendant effects discussed above? 
Should they instead provide an otherwise unnatural or forced 
reading of the legislation, one that avoids an inconsistency with 
the human right provision—understood as the judges understand 
it—but does so only at the cost of seriously hindering, if not 
outright thwarting, the government’s objectives? Or should they 
do nothing? The easy route is simply to say this: Judges should 
take whatever steps they deem necessary to enforce the relevant 
human rights, as they understand them. This, after all, is what 
they are charged with doing when they are given the power of 
constitutional review under the HRA. A strength of Kavanagh’s 
analysis and defense of constitutional review under that Act is 
that she does not take this easy route. Instead, Kavanagh 
explores the nature of deference and provides a sophisticated 
analysis of how best to balance the demands of judicial 
supervision against the demands of judicial deference in a 
constitutional democracy. Drawing on an extensive analysis of 
the relevant case law, Kavanagh defends “a variable and 
contextual approach to determining the constitutionally 
appropriate degree of deference in a particular case” (p. 201). 
This approach “firmly rejects the idea that substantial judicial 
deference should be given the elected branches [of government] 
in a routine or blanket fashion” (p. 201). This approach also 
rejects outright any attempt to carve out, ab initio, certain 
subject areas as ones in which particular degrees of deference 
are either warranted or inappropriate. Whether and to what 
degree judges should defer to legislative decisions must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a range 
of different institutional and epistemic considerations bearing on 
the case at hand. These include: (a) the role of the judiciary as a 
secondary decision-maker charged not with the duty to make 
primary decisions based on an assessment of the reasons for and 
against an act of government, but with the secondary 
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responsibility to vet the primary decisions of others for 
conformity with constitutional constraints; and (b) the degree of 
uncertainty attached to the particular question at issue. As she 
sees it, “deference is a rational response to uncertainty”; 
“judicial deference and uncertainty have an inverse relationship: 
the more certainty, the less deference and vice versa” (p. 171). 
Further relevant factors include: (c) the competence and 
expertise of the legislature compared with the judiciary to decide 
on the matter in question. “When a case concerns an issue which 
would require widespread or radical reform of various 
interlinked areas of the law, a responsible judge will sometimes 
pay substantial deference to the superior law-making 
competence of Parliament” (p. 182); and finally (d) the superior 
resources, capacity, and, hence, democratic legitimacy, of the 
elected branches of government “to ensure that there is an 
acceptable reconciliation of competing social interests, when a 
matter is highly controversial” (p. 194). There is no easy formula 
to apply here. Each case must be assessed on its own terms, with 
full sensitivity to all the relevant factors. 
This analysis strikes me as an eminently sensible one, 
particularly in its recognition that there are no easy cookie-
cutter solutions to issues of deference. If I had one small 
quibble—and it is a small one—it would be that Kavanagh’s 
analysis, with its otherwise laudable emphasis on case-by-case 
assessment, may underplay the relevance of the fact that what is 
at issue here are human rights. These seem qualitatively different 
from most, if not all, of the other social interests at play in cases 
involving the issue of deference. This is not to say that Kavanagh 
is unaware of the importance of this qualitative difference. After 
all, it is no doubt included under factor (c) above, the respective 
competencies of courts and legislatures to decide on the issue at 
hand, a matter she spends a considerable amount of time 
discussing at various points in her book. But the vital importance 
of human rights, and the standing temptations of governments to 
give them short shrift in exigent times, may warrant our treating 
these interests as special. Perhaps here the appropriate degree of 
judicial deference should be governed by fixed rules. 
In the third and final part of her book, Kavanagh sets out to 
“tackle the big constitutional questions” (p. 8). These include the 
HRA’s compatibility, in theory, with the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, as well as the array of underlying 
normative questions about the very justification of constitutional 
review in a democracy. Concerning the compatibility of the 
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HRA with parliamentary sovereignty, Kavanagh is at pains to 
stress several crucial points. Dicey notwithstanding, it is no 
longer (if it ever was) true that “Parliament . . . has, under the 
English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised . . . 
as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.”4 According the Kavanagh, “the orthodox principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty as stated by Dicey has very little 
explanatory force” (p. 316). It neither provides an accurate 
descriptive account of British constitutional practice, nor 
manages to explain and illuminate key features of that practice. 
Not only is Parliament subject to significant political constraints 
on its power to act as it pleases, the orthodox principle also “fails 
to account for the considerable legal limitations on the power of 
Parliament to enact laws, most obviously, those which arise from 
the UK’s membership of the European Union” (p. 317). Union 
membership places the UK under the duty to recognize the 
superior status of EU law. Along with this comes the “necessary 
corollary that if an Act of Parliament comes into conflict with 
EU law, the former will be ‘disapplied’” (p. 317). Yet another 
feature of British constitutional practice that counts against the 
orthodox view is one discussed above—the considerable 
interpretive powers UK judges have long enjoyed. “One of the 
underlying themes of [Kavanagh’s] book [is] that through the 
traditional doctrines of statutory interpretation, the courts have 
always constrained Parliament’s ability to enact legislation which 
violates fundamental constitutional rights” (p. 328, emphasis 
added). So if it was once true that the powers of Parliament were 
as unbridled as Dicey suggests, it seems pretty clear that this has 
not been true for some time now. 
This brings us to the final, and perhaps most theoretical 
chapters of Kavanagh’s book, where she tackles an array of 
philosophical criticisms of constitutional review in a democracy. 
Most of the arguments are familiar. First, judges are not Platonic 
kings and queens with pipelines to the truth about political 
morality, including those parts which deal with human rights, so 
why should they, as opposed to legislators, be assigned the task 
of discerning the truth about human rights? Second, leaving 
questions of fundamental human rights to be determined by 
judges in their chambers reduces the level of public discourse 
 
 4. P. 314 (quoting ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE 
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-40 (10th ed., 1959)). 
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and debate on these important issues of political morality and, 
therefore, hinders their recognition and enforcement. Third, 
judges lack the informational resources enjoyed by legislative 
bodies, and are therefore in a very poor position to perform the 
delicate balancing required to reconcile human rights with the 
many other pressing social interests at stake in typical human 
rights cases. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
constitutional review robs ordinary citizens (and their elected 
representatives) of their right to participate fully in communal 
decision-making about fundamental matters of political 
morality, including the nature and proper limits of fundamental 
human rights. In short, constitutional review is fundamentally at 
odds with democracy. 
In addressing these and other concerns, Kavanagh marshals 
an array of arguments with which readers of her work will also 
be well familiar. According to Kavanagh, constitutional review 
under the HRA is not a substitute for legislative decision-making 
on a particular set of political questions. On the contrary, 
Parliament retains its role as the primary decision-maker, while 
judges are restricted to a much narrower, different set of 
questions concerning the compatibility of Parliament’s activities 
with Convention rights authoritatively adopted by the 
democratically accountable branches of governments. In short, 
constitutional review does not involve the Courts asking the very 
same sets of questions as the more overtly political branches and 
substituting their answers for those of their more democratically 
accountable counterparts. 
[The courts] are . . . partners in a constitutional collaboration, 
who are charged with the (often creative) task of furthering, 
determining, applying and sometimes modifying 
[Parliament’s] will in order to achieve a Convention-
compatible result. In terms of its constitutional position as the 
primary law-maker, Parliament is undoubtedly the senior 
partner. It has the power to make law on any subject, at any 
time, and virtually for any reason (p. 407). 
A system of government in which unelected judges have the 
power to modify, and, in some cases, thwart the will of 
Parliament in the ways sanctioned by the HRA is, Kavanagh is 
prepared to concede, inherently undemocratic. She is not, she 
says, prepared to endorse what Ronald Dworkin calls the 
“constitutional” conception of democracy, according to which a 
system of government is democratic not merely because and 
insofar as it encompasses recognized forms of democratic 
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procedure (e.g., one person one vote) that are “responsive, in 
some meaningful way to popular opinion and input,” but 
because it manages, in one way or another, to protect the equal 
moral status of all members of the relevant community. On the 
contrary, Kavanagh argues that democracy and justice represent 
two different values, and constitutional review is always 
purchased at “a democratic cost” (p. 368). But it is a cost well 
worth paying for the sake of justice to the individual. This is not 
its only advantage, however. Drawing on familiar arguments that 
unbridled democratic procedures tend to marginalize the 
interests of entrenched minorities, Kavanagh further argues that 
judicial review affords disadvantaged groups and individuals an 
additional—and in some cases, the only—source of access to the 
levers of political power. It thereby helps promote equal effective 
participation in political decision-making.  
[T]he existence of an independent tribunal to review and 
assess the Convention-compatibility of legislation is valuable, 
because it enables those groups at least to get their case heard 
in a forum which is relatively independent of the political 
power structures which may otherwise prevent them from 
getting to protection of their rights” (p. 378). Without 
constitutional review, “the idea that genuinely equal 
participation can be achieved simply by giving everyone the 
right to participate is no more than a ‘pious aspiration’ (p. 
378).  
In short, the interests underlying the democratic right to 
participate in political decision-making “(namely, autonomy, 
dignity, inclusion, etc.) are better protected by having 
democratic government combined with constitutional review” 
(p. 379). If this is so, and I believe it is, one wonders why 
Kavanagh so readily concedes that constitutional review is 
inherently undemocratic. If, absent constitutional review, many 
are left with ineffective representation, how can constitutional 
review be inherently undemocratic? One would have thought 
that, in helping to secure effective participation, it thereby 
enhances the realization of a properly functioning democracy. In 
other words, without constitutional review, the realization of 
democratic values remains, in most societies, “a pious 
aspiration.” 
In this review, I have managed only to touch upon the 
wealth of legal analysis, historical scholarship, and philosophical 
argument contained within Kavanagh’s impressive book. Suffice 
to say that those who would like to learn something—or a bit 
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more—about the status of constitutionalism outside North 
American borders and who relish sophisticated, balanced 
philosophical analysis informed by a thorough understanding of 
the relevant legal practice would be well advised to read this 
book. 
 
